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Abstract
To protect user data and privacy, Internet transport protocols have supported payload
encryption and authentication for some time. Such encryption and authentication are now also
starting to be applied to the transport protocol headers. This helps avoid transport protocol
ossification by middleboxes, mitigate attacks against the transport protocol, and protect
metadata about the communication. Current operational practice in some networks inspect
transport header information within the network, but this is no longer possible when those
transport headers are encrypted.
This document discusses the possible impact when network traffic uses a protocol with an
encrypted transport header. It suggests issues to consider when designing new transport
protocols or features.
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1. Introduction 
The transport layer supports the end-to-end flow of data across a network path, providing
features such as connection establishment, reliability, framing, ordering, congestion control, flow
control, etc., as needed to support applications. One of the core functions of an Internet transport
is to discover and adapt to the characteristics of the network path that is currently being used.
For some years, it has been common for the transport-layer payload to be protected by
encryption and authentication but for the transport-layer headers to be sent unprotected.
Examples of protocols that behave in this manner include Transport Layer Security (TLS) over
TCP , Datagram TLS  , the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol 
, and tcpcrypt . The use of unencrypted transport headers has led some
network operators, researchers, and others to develop tools and processes that rely on
observations of transport headers both in aggregate and at the flow level to infer details of the
network's behaviour and inform operational practice.
Transport protocols are now being developed that encrypt some or all of the transport headers,
in addition to the transport payload data. The QUIC transport protocol  is an example
of such a protocol. Such transport header encryption makes it difficult to observe transport
protocol behaviour from the vantage point of the network. This document discusses some
implications of transport header encryption for network operators and researchers that have
previously observed transport headers, and it highlights some issues to consider for transport
protocol designers.
As discussed in , the IETF has concluded that Pervasive Monitoring (PM) is a technical
attack that needs to be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols. This document supports that
conclusion. It also recognises that  states, "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate
PM is not an acceptable outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented
here. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are
considered." This document is written to provide input to the discussion around what is an
appropriate balance by highlighting some implications of transport header encryption.
7.  Conclusions
8.  Security Considerations
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Current uses of transport header information by network devices on the Internet path are
explained. These uses can be beneficial or malicious. This is written to provide input to the
discussion around what is an appropriate balance by highlighting some implications of transport
header encryption.
2. Current Uses of Transport Headers within the Network 
In response to pervasive surveillance  revelations and the IETF consensus that
"Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack" , efforts are underway to increase encryption of
Internet traffic. Applying confidentiality to transport header fields can improve privacy and can
help to mitigate certain attacks or manipulation of packets by devices on the network path, but it
can also affect network operations and measurement .
When considering what parts of the transport headers should be encrypted to provide
confidentiality and what parts should be visible to network devices (including unencrypted but
authenticated headers), it is necessary to consider both the impact on network operations and
management and the implications for ossification and user privacy . Different
parties will view the relative importance of these concerns differently. For some, the benefits of
encrypting all the transport headers outweigh the impact of doing so; others might analyse the
security, privacy, and ossification impacts and arrive at a different trade-off.
This section reviews examples of the observation of transport-layer headers within the network
by using devices on the network path or by using information exported by an on-path device.
Unencrypted transport headers provide information that can support network operations and
management, and this section notes some ways in which this has been done. Unencrypted
transport header information also contributes metadata that can be exploited for purposes
unrelated to network transport measurement, diagnostics, or troubleshooting (e.g., to block or to
throttle traffic from a specific content provider), and this section also notes some threats relating
to unencrypted transport headers.
Exposed transport information also provides a source of information that contributes to linked
data sets, which could be exploited to deduce private information, e.g., user patterns, user
location, tracking behaviour, etc. This might reveal information the parties did not intend to be
revealed.  aims to make designers, implementers, and users of Internet protocols
aware of privacy-related design choices in IETF protocols.
This section does not consider intentional modification of transport headers by middleboxes,
such as devices performing Network Address Translation (NAT) or firewalls.
2.1. To Separate Flows in Network Devices 
Some network-layer mechanisms separate network traffic by flow without resorting to
identifying the type of traffic: hash-based load sharing across paths (e.g., Equal-Cost Multipath
(ECMP)); sharing across a group of links (e.g., using a Link Aggregation Group (LAG)); ensuring
equal access to link capacity (e.g., Fair Queuing (FQ)); or distributing traffic to servers (e.g., load
balancing). To prevent packet reordering, forwarding engines can consistently forward the same
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tuple gleaned from a combination of link header information through to transport header
information. This n-tuple can use the Media Access Control (MAC) address and IP addresses and
can include observable transport header information.
When transport header information cannot be observed, there can be less information to
separate flows at equipment along the path. Flow separation might not be possible when a
transport forms traffic into an encrypted aggregate. For IPv6, the Flow Label  can be
used even when all transport information is encrypted, enabling Flow Label-based ECMP 
 and load sharing .
[RFC6437]
[RFC6438] [RFC7098]
2.2. To Identify Transport Protocols and Flows 
Information in exposed transport-layer headers can be used by the network to identify transport
protocols and flows . The ability to identify transport protocols, flows, and sessions is a
common function performed, for example, by measurement activities, Quality of Service (QoS)
classifiers, and firewalls. These functions can be beneficial and performed with the consent of,
and in support of, the end user. Alternatively, the same mechanisms could be used to support
practises that might be adversarial to the end user, including blocking, deprioritising, and
monitoring traffic without consent.
Observable transport header information, together with information in the network header, has
been used to identify flows and their connection state, together with the set of protocol options
being used. Transport protocols, such as TCP  and the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) , specify a standard base header that includes sequence number
information and other data. They also have the possibility to negotiate additional headers at
connection setup, identified by an option number in the transport header.
In some uses, an assigned transport port (e.g., 0..49151) can identify the upper-layer protocol or
service . However, port information alone is not sufficient to guarantee identification.
Applications can use arbitrary ports and do not need to use assigned port numbers. The use of an
assigned port number is also not limited to the protocol for which the port is intended. Multiple
sessions can also be multiplexed on a single port, and ports can be reused by subsequent
sessions.
Some flows can be identified by observing signalling data (e.g., see  and ) or
through the use of magic numbers placed in the first byte(s) of a datagram payload .
When transport header information cannot be observed, this removes information that could
have been used to classify flows by passive observers along the path. More ambitious ways could
be used to collect, estimate, or infer flow information, including heuristics based on the analysis
of traffic patterns, such as classification of flows relying on timing, volumes of information, and
correlation between multiple flows. For example, an operator that cannot access the Session
Description Protocol (SDP) session descriptions  to classify a flow as audio traffic might
instead use (possibly less-reliable) heuristics to infer that short UDP packets with regular spacing
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scope for this document, and are only mentioned here to recognise that encryption does not
prevent operators from attempting to apply practises that were used with unencrypted transport
headers.
The IAB  has provided a summary of expected implications of increased encryption on
network functions that use the observable headers and describe the expected benefits of designs
that explicitly declare protocol-invariant header information that can be used for this purpose.
[RFC8546]
2.3. To Understand Transport Protocol Performance 
This subsection describes use by the network of exposed transport-layer headers to understand
transport protocol performance and behaviour.
2.3.1. Using Information Derived from Transport-Layer Headers 
Observable transport headers enable explicit measurement and analysis of protocol
performance and detection of network anomalies at any point along the Internet path. Some
operators use passive monitoring to manage their portion of the Internet by characterising the
performance of link/network segments. Inferences from transport headers are used to derive
performance metrics:
Traffic Rate and Volume:
Per-application traffic rate and volume measures can be used to characterise the traffic that
uses a network segment or the pattern of network usage. Observing the protocol sequence
number and packet size offers one way to measure this (e.g., measurements observing
counters in periodic reports, such as RTCP   , or measurements
observing protocol sequence numbers in statistical samples of packet flows or specific control
packets, such as those observed at the start and end of a flow).
Measurements can be per endpoint or for an endpoint aggregate. These could be used to
assess usage or for subscriber billing.
Such measurements can be used to trigger traffic shaping and to associate QoS support within
the network and lower layers. This can be done with consent and in support of an end user to
improve quality of service or could be used by the network to deprioritise certain flows
without user consent.
The traffic rate and volume can be determined, providing that the packets belonging to
individual flows can be identified, but there might be no additional information about a flow
when the transport headers cannot be observed.
Loss Rate and Loss Pattern:
Flow loss rate can be derived (e.g., from transport sequence numbers or inferred from
observing transport protocol interactions) and has been used as a metric for performance
assessment and to characterise transport behaviour. Network operators have used the
variation in patterns to detect changes in the offered service. Understanding the location and
root cause of loss can help an operator determine whether this requires corrective action.
[RFC3550] [RFC3711] [RFC4585]
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There are various causes of loss, including: corruption of link frames (e.g., due to interference
on a radio link); buffering loss (e.g., overflow due to congestion, Active Queue Management
(AQM) , or inadequate provision following traffic preemption), and policing (e.g.,
traffic management ). Understanding flow loss rates requires maintaining the per-
flow state (flow identification often requires transport-layer information) and either
observing the increase in sequence numbers in the network or transport headers or
comparing a per-flow packet counter with the number of packets that the flow actually sent.
Per-hop loss can also sometimes be monitored at the interface level by devices on the network
path or by using in-situ methods operating over a network segment (see Section 3.3).
The pattern of loss can provide insight into the cause of loss. Losses can often occur as bursts,
randomly timed events, etc. It can also be valuable to understand the conditions under which
loss occurs. This usually requires relating loss to the traffic flowing at a network node or
segment at the time of loss. Transport header information can help identify cases where loss
could have been wrongly identified or where the transport did not require retransmission of
a lost packet.
Throughput and Goodput:
Throughput is the amount of payload data sent by a flow per time interval. Goodput (the
subset of throughput consisting of useful traffic; see  and ) is
a measure of useful data exchanged. The throughput of a flow can be determined in the
absence of transport header information, providing that the individual flow can be identified,
and the overhead known. Goodput requires the ability to differentiate loss and
retransmission of packets, for example, by observing packet sequence numbers in the TCP or
RTP headers . 
Latency:
Latency is a key performance metric that impacts application and user-perceived response
times. It often indirectly impacts throughput and flow completion time. This determines the
reaction time of the transport protocol itself, impacting flow setup, congestion control, loss
recovery, and other transport mechanisms. The observed latency can have many components 
. Of these, unnecessary/unwanted queueing in buffers of the network devices on the
path has often been observed as a significant factor . Once the cause of unwanted
latency has been identified, this can often be eliminated.
To measure latency across a part of a path, an observation point  can measure the
experienced round-trip time (RTT) by using packet sequence numbers and acknowledgements
or by observing header timestamp information. Such information allows an observation point
on the network path to determine not only the path RTT but also allows measurement of the
upstream and downstream contribution to the RTT. This could be used to locate a source of
latency, e.g., by observing cases where the median RTT is much greater than the minimum
RTT for a part of a path.
The service offered by network operators can benefit from latency information to understand
the impact of configuration changes and to tune deployed services. Latency metrics are key to
evaluating and deploying AQM , Diffserv , and Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN)  . Measurements could identify excessively large
[RFC7567]
[RFC2475]
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buffers, indicating where to deploy or configure AQM. An AQM method is often deployed in
combination with other techniques, such as scheduling  , and although
parameter-less methods are desired , current methods often require tuning 
   because they cannot scale across all possible deployment
scenarios.
Latency and round-trip time information can potentially expose some information useful for
approximate geolocation, as discussed in .
Variation in Delay:
Some network applications are sensitive to (small) changes in packet timing (jitter). Short- and
long-term delay variation can impact the latency of a flow and hence the perceived quality of
applications using a network path. For example, jitter metrics are often cited when
characterising paths supporting real-time traffic. The expected performance of such
applications can be inferred from a measure of the variation in delay observed along a
portion of the path  . The requirements resemble those for the
measurement of latency. 
Flow Reordering:
Significant packet reordering within a flow can impact time-critical applications and can be
interpreted as loss by reliable transports. Many transport protocol techniques are impacted
by reordering (e.g., triggering TCP retransmission or rebuffering of real-time applications).
Packet reordering can occur for many reasons, e.g., from equipment design to
misconfiguration of forwarding rules. Flow identification is often required to avoid significant
packet misordering (e.g., when using ECMP, or LAG). Network tools can detect and measure
unwanted/excessive reordering and the impact on transport performance.
There have been initiatives in the IETF transport area to reduce the impact of reordering
within a transport flow, possibly leading to a reduction in the requirements for preserving
ordering. These have potential to simplify network equipment design as well as the potential
to improve robustness of the transport service. Measurements of reordering can help
understand the present level of reordering and inform decisions about how to progress new
mechanisms.
Techniques for measuring reordering typically observe packet sequence numbers. Metrics
have been defined that evaluate whether a network path has maintained packet order on a
packet-by-packet basis  . Some protocols provide in-built monitoring and
reporting functions. Transport fields in the RTP header   can be observed
to derive traffic volume measurements and provide information on the progress and quality
of a session using RTP. Metadata assists in understanding the context under which the data
was collected, including the time, observation point , and way in which metrics
were accumulated. The RTCP protocol directly reports some of this information in a form that
can be directly visible by devices on the network path.
In some cases, measurements could involve active injection of test traffic to perform a
measurement (see ). However, most operators do not have access to user
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Injection of test traffic can incur an additional cost in running such tests (e.g., the implications of
capacity tests in a mobile network segment are obvious). Some active measurements 
(e.g., response under load or particular workloads) perturb other traffic and could require
dedicated access to the network segment.
Passive measurements (see ) can have advantages in terms of eliminating
unproductive test traffic, reducing the influence of test traffic on the overall traffic mix, and
having the ability to choose the point of observation (see Section 2.4.1). Measurements can rely
on observing packet headers, which is not possible if those headers are encrypted, but could
utilise information about traffic volumes or patterns of interaction to deduce metrics.
Passive packet sampling techniques are also often used to scale the processing involved in
observing packets on high-rate links. This exports only the packet header information of
(randomly) selected packets. Interpretation of the exported information relies on understanding
of the header information. The utility of these measurements depends on the type of network
segment/link and number of mechanisms used by the network devices. Simple routers are
relatively easy to manage, but a device with more complexity demands understanding of the
choice of many system parameters.
[RFC7799]
Section 3.6 of [RFC7799]
2.3.2. Using Information Derived from Network-Layer Header Fields 
Information from the transport header can be used by a multi-field (MF) classifier as a part of
policy framework. Policies are commonly used for management of the QoS or Quality of
Experience (QoE) in resource-constrained networks or by firewalls to implement access rules
(see also ). Policies can support user applications/services or protect
against unwanted or lower-priority traffic (Section 2.4.4).
Transport-layer information can also be explicitly carried in network-layer header fields that are
not encrypted, serving as a replacement/addition to the exposed transport header information 
. This information can enable a different forwarding treatment by the devices forming
the network path, even when a transport employs encryption to protect other header
information.
On the one hand, the user of a transport that multiplexes multiple subflows might want to
obscure the presence and characteristics of these subflows. On the other hand, an encrypted
transport could set the network-layer information to indicate the presence of subflows and to
reflect the service requirements of individual subflows. There are several ways this could be
done:
IP Address:
Applications normally expose the endpoint addresses used in the forwarding decisions in
network devices. Address and other protocol information can be used by an MF classifier to
determine how traffic is treated  and hence affects the quality of experience for a
flow. Common issues concerning IP address sharing are described in . 
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Using the IPv6 Network-Layer Flow Label:
A number of Standards Track and Best Current Practice RFCs (e.g., , , and 
) encourage endpoints to set the IPv6 Flow Label field of the network-layer header.
As per , IPv6 source nodes "  assign each unrelated transport connection and
application data stream to a new flow." A multiplexing transport could choose to use multiple
flow labels to allow the network to independently forward subflows.  provides
further guidance on choosing a flow label value, stating these "should be chosen such that
their bits exhibit a high degree of variability" and chosen so that "third parties should be
unlikely to be able to guess the next value that a source of flow labels will choose."
Once set, a flow label can provide information that can help inform network-layer queueing
and forwarding, including use with IPsec , Equal-Cost Multipath routing, and Link
Aggregation .
The choice of how to assign a flow label needs to avoid introducing linkages between flows
that a network device could not otherwise observe. Inappropriate use by the transport can
have privacy implications (e.g., assigning the same label to two independent flows that ought
not to be classified similarly).
Using the Network-Layer Differentiated Services Code Point:
Applications can expose their delivery expectations to network devices by setting the
Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP) field of IPv4 and IPv6 packets . For
example, WebRTC applications identify different forwarding treatments for individual
subflows (audio vs. video) based on the value of the DSCP field ). This provides
explicit information to inform network-layer queueing and forwarding, rather than an
operator inferring traffic requirements from transport and application headers via a multi-
field classifier. Inappropriate use by the transport can have privacy implications (e.g.,
assigning a different DSCP to a subflow could assist in a network device discovering the traffic
pattern used by an application). The field is mutable, i.e., some network devices can be
expected to change this field. Since the DSCP value can impact the quality of experience for a
flow, observations of service performance have to consider this field when a network path
supports differentiated service treatment. 
Using Explicit Congestion Notification:
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)  is a transport mechanism that uses the ECN
field in the network-layer header. Use of ECN explicitly informs the network layer that a
transport is ECN capable and requests ECN treatment of the flow. An ECN-capable transport
can offer benefits when used over a path with equipment that implements an AQM method
with Congestion Experienced (CE) marking of IP packets , since it can react to
congestion without also having to recover from lost packets.
ECN exposes the presence of congestion. The reception of CE-marked packets can be used to
estimate the level of incipient congestion on the upstream portion of the path from the point
of observation ( ). Interpreting the marking behaviour (i.e., assessing
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AQM and ECN offer a range of algorithms and configuration options. Tools therefore have to
be available to network operators and researchers to understand the implication of
configuration choices and transport behaviour as the use of ECN increases and new methods
emerge .
Network-Layer Options:
Network protocols can carry optional headers (see Section 5.1). These can explicitly expose
transport header information to on-path devices operating at the network layer (as discussed
further in Section 6).
IPv4  has provisions for optional header fields. IP routers can examine these
headers and are required to ignore IPv4 options that they do not recognise. Many current
paths include network devices that forward packets that carry options on a slower processing
path. Some network devices (e.g., firewalls) can be (and are) configured to drop these packets 
. BCP 186  provides guidance on how operators should treat IPv4 packets
that specify options.
IPv6 can encode optional network-layer information in separate headers that may be placed
between the IPv6 header and the upper-layer header  (e.g., the IPv6 Alternate
Marking Method , which can be used to measure packet loss and delay
metrics). The Hop-by-Hop Options header, when present, immediately follows the IPv6
header. IPv6 permits this header to be examined by any node along the path if explicitly
configured .
Careful use of the network-layer features (e.g., extension headers can; see Section 5) help provide








2.4. To Support Network Operations 
Some network operators make use of on-path observations of transport headers to analyse the
service offered to the users of a network segment and inform operational practice and can help
detect and locate network problems.  gives an operator's perspective about such use.
When observable transport header information is not available, those seeking an understanding
of transport behaviour and dynamics might learn to work without that information.
Alternatively, they might use more limited measurements combined with pattern inference and
other heuristics to infer network behaviour (see ). Operational practises
aimed at inferring transport parameters are out of scope for this document and are only
mentioned here to recognise that encryption does not necessarily stop operators from attempting
to apply practises that have been used with unencrypted transport headers.
This section discusses topics concerning observation of transport flows, with a focus on transport
measurement.
[RFC8517]
Section 2.1.1 of [RFC8404]
RFC 9065 Transport Header Encryption July 2021
Fairhurst & Perkins Informational Page 11
2.4.2. Network Planning and Provisioning 
Traffic rate and volume measurements are used to help plan deployment of new equipment and
configuration in networks. Data is also valuable to equipment vendors who want to understand
traffic trends and patterns of usage as inputs to decisions about planning products and
provisioning for new deployments.
Trends in aggregate traffic can be observed and can be related to the endpoint addresses being
used, but when transport header information is not observable, it might be impossible to
correlate patterns in measurements with changes in transport protocols. This increases the
dependency on other indirect sources of information to inform planning and provisioning.
2.4.1. Problem Location 
Observations of transport header information can be used to locate the source of problems or to
assess the performance of a network segment. Often issues can only be understood in the context
of the other flows that share a particular path, particular device configuration, interface port, etc.
A simple example is monitoring of a network device that uses a scheduler or active queue
management technique , where it could be desirable to understand whether the
algorithms are correctly controlling latency or if overload protection is working. This implies
knowledge of how traffic is assigned to any subqueues used for flow scheduling but can require
information about how the traffic dynamics impact active queue management, starvation
prevention mechanisms, and circuit breakers.
Sometimes correlating observations of headers at multiple points along the path (e.g., at the
ingress and egress of a network segment) allows an observer to determine the contribution of a
portion of the path to an observed metric (e.g., to locate a source of delay, jitter, loss, reordering,
or congestion marking).
[RFC7567]
2.4.3. Compliance with Congestion Control 
The traffic that can be observed by on-path network devices (the "wire image") is a function of
transport protocol design/options, network use, applications, and user characteristics. In general,
when only a small proportion of the traffic has a specific (different) characteristic, such traffic
seldom leads to operational concern, although the ability to measure and monitor it is lower. The
desire to understand the traffic and protocol interactions typically grows as the proportion of
traffic increases. The challenges increase when multiple instances of an evolving protocol
contribute to the traffic that share network capacity.
Operators can manage traffic load (e.g., when the network is severely overloaded) by deploying
rate limiters, traffic shaping, or network transport circuit breakers . The information
provided by observing transport headers is a source of data that can help to inform such
mechanisms.
[RFC8084]
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Congestion Control Compliance of Traffic:
Congestion control is a key transport function . Many network operators implicitly
accept that TCP traffic complies with a behaviour that is acceptable for the shared Internet.
TCP algorithms have been continuously improved over decades and have reached a level of
efficiency and correctness that is difficult to match in custom application-layer mechanisms 
.
A standards-compliant TCP stack provides congestion control that is judged safe for use across
the Internet. Applications developed on top of well-designed transports can be expected to
appropriately control their network usage, reacting when the network experiences
congestion, by backing off and reducing the load placed on the network. This is the normal
expected behaviour for IETF-specified transports (e.g., TCP and SCTP).
Congestion Control Compliance for UDP Traffic:
UDP provides a minimal message-passing datagram transport that has no inherent congestion
control mechanisms. Because congestion control is critical to the stable operation of the
Internet, applications and other protocols that choose to use UDP as a transport have to
employ mechanisms to prevent collapse, avoid unacceptable contributions to jitter/latency,
and establish an acceptable share of capacity with concurrent traffic .
UDP flows that expose a well-known header can be observed to gain understanding of the
dynamics of a flow and its congestion control behaviour. For example, tools exist to monitor
various aspects of RTP header information and RTCP reports for real-time flows (see Section
2.3). The Secure RTP and RTCP extensions  were explicitly designed to expose some
header information to enable such observation while protecting the payload data.
A network operator can observe the headers of transport protocols layered above UDP to
understand if the datagram flows comply with congestion control expectations. This can help
inform a decision on whether it might be appropriate to deploy methods, such as rate
limiters, to enforce acceptable usage. The available information determines the level of
precision with which flows can be classified and the design space for conditioning
mechanisms (e.g., rate-limiting, circuit breaker techniques , or blocking
uncharacterised traffic) .
When anomalies are detected, tools can interpret the transport header information to help
understand the impact of specific transport protocols (or protocol mechanisms) on the other
traffic that shares a network. An observer on the network path can gain an understanding of the
dynamics of a flow and its congestion control behaviour. Analysing observed flows can help to
build confidence that an application flow backs off its share of the network load under persistent
congestion and hence to understand whether the behaviour is appropriate for sharing limited
network capacity. For example, it is common to visualise plots of TCP sequence numbers versus
time for a flow to understand how a flow shares available capacity, deduce its dynamics in
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2.4.5. To Support Network Security Functions 
On-path observation of the transport headers of packets can be used for various security
functions. For example, Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against the
infrastructure or against an endpoint can be detected and mitigated by characterising anomalous
traffic (see Section 2.4.4) on a shorter timescale. Other uses include support for security audits
(e.g., verifying the compliance with cipher suites), client and application fingerprinting for
inventory, and alerts provided for network intrusion detection and other next generation
firewall functions.
When using an encrypted transport, endpoints can directly provide information to support these
security functions. Another method, if the endpoints do not provide this information, is to use an
on-path network device that relies on pattern inferences in the traffic and heuristics or machine
learning instead of processing observed header information. An endpoint could also explicitly
cooperate with an on-path device (e.g., a QUIC endpoint could share information about current
uses of connection IDs).
The ability to identify sources and flows that contribute to persistent congestion is important to
the safe operation of network infrastructure and can inform configuration of network devices to
complement the endpoint congestion avoidance mechanisms   to avoid a
portion of the network being driven into congestion collapse .
[RFC7567] [RFC8084]
[RFC2914]
2.4.4. To Characterise "Unknown" Network Traffic 
The patterns and types of traffic that share Internet capacity change over time as networked
applications, usage patterns, and protocols continue to evolve.
Encryption can increase the volume of "unknown" or "uncharacterised" traffic seen by the
network. If these traffic patterns form a small part of the traffic aggregate passing through a
network device or segment of the network path, the dynamics of the uncharacterised traffic
might not have a significant collateral impact on the performance of other traffic that shares this
network segment. Once the proportion of this traffic increases, monitoring the traffic can
determine if appropriate safety measures have to be put in place.
Tracking the impact of new mechanisms and protocols requires traffic volume to be measured
and new transport behaviours to be identified. This is especially true of protocols operating over
a UDP substrate. The level and style of encryption needs to be considered in determining how
this activity is performed.
Traffic that cannot be classified typically receives a default treatment. Some networks block or
rate-limit traffic that cannot be classified.
2.4.6. Network Diagnostics and Troubleshooting 
Operators monitor the health of a network segment to support a variety of operational tasks 
, including procedures to provide early warning and trigger action, e.g., to diagnose
network problems, to manage security threats (including DoS), to evaluate equipment or protocol
performance, or to respond to user performance questions. Information about transport flows
can assist in setting buffer sizes and help identify whether link/network tuning is effective.
[RFC8404]
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Information can also support debugging and diagnosis of the root causes of faults that concern a
particular user's traffic and can support postmortem investigation after an anomaly. Sections 
3.1.2 and 5 of  provide further examples.
Network segments vary in their complexity. The design trade-offs for radio networks are often
very different from those of wired networks . A radio-based network (e.g., cellular
mobile, enterprise Wireless LAN (WLAN), satellite access/backhaul, point-to-point radio) adds a
subsystem that performs radio resource management, with impact on the available capacity and
potentially loss/reordering of packets. This impact can differ by traffic type and can be correlated
with link propagation and interference. These can impact the cost and performance of a
provided service and is expected to increase in importance as operators bring together




2.4.7. Tooling and Network Operations 
A variety of open source and proprietary tools have been deployed that use the transport header
information observable with widely used protocols, such as TCP or RTP/UDP/IP. Tools that dissect
network traffic flows can alert to potential problems that are hard to derive from volume
measurements, link statistics, or device measurements alone.
Any introduction of a new transport protocol, protocol feature, or application might require
changes to such tools and could impact operational practice and policies. Such changes have
associated costs that are incurred by the network operators that need to update their tooling or
develop alternative practises that work without access to the changed/removed information.
The use of encryption has the desirable effect of preventing unintended observation of the
payload data, and these tools seldom seek to observe the payload or other application details. A
flow that hides its transport header information could imply "don't touch" to some operators.
This might limit a trouble-shooting response to "can't help, no trouble found".
An alternative that does not require access to an observable transport headers is to access
endpoint diagnostic tools or to include user involvement in diagnosing and troubleshooting
unusual use cases or to troubleshoot nontrivial problems. Another approach is to use traffic
pattern analysis. Such tools can provide useful information during network anomalies (e.g.,
detecting significant reordering, high or intermittent loss); however, indirect measurements
need to be carefully designed to provide information for diagnostics and troubleshooting.
If new protocols, or protocol extensions, are made to closely resemble or match existing
mechanisms, then the changes to tooling and the associated costs can be small. Equally, more
extensive changes to the transport tend to require more extensive, and more expensive, changes
to tooling and operational practice. Protocol designers can mitigate these costs by explicitly
choosing to expose selected information as invariants that are guaranteed not to change for a
particular protocol (e.g., the header invariants and the spin bit in QUIC ). Specification
of common log formats and development of alternative approaches can also help mitigate the
costs of transport changes.
[RFC9000]
RFC 9065 Transport Header Encryption July 2021
Fairhurst & Perkins Informational Page 15
2.5. To Mitigate the Effects of Constrained Networks 
Some link and network segments are constrained by the capacity they can offer by the time it
takes to access capacity (e.g., due to underlying radio resource management methods) or by
asymmetries in the design (e.g., many link are designed so that the capacity available is different
in the forward and return directions; some radio technologies have different access methods in
the forward and return directions resulting from differences in the power budget).
The impact of path constraints can be mitigated using a proxy operating at or above the
transport layer to use an alternate transport protocol.
In many cases, one or both endpoints are unaware of the characteristics of the constraining link
or network segment, and mitigations are applied below the transport layer. Packet classification
and QoS methods (described in various sections) can be beneficial in differentially prioritising
certain traffic when there is a capacity constraint or additional delay in scheduling link
transmissions. Another common mitigation is to apply header compression over the specific link
or subnetwork (see Section 2.5.1).
2.5.1. To Provide Header Compression 
Header compression saves link capacity by compressing network and transport protocol headers
on a per-hop basis. This has been widely used with low bandwidth dial-up access links and still
finds application on wireless links that are subject to capacity constraints. These methods are
effective for bit-congestive links sending small packets (e.g., reducing the cost for sending control
packets or small data packets over radio links).
Examples of header compression include use with TCP/IP and RTP/UDP/IP flows  
   . Successful compression depends on observing the
transport headers and understanding the way fields change between packets and is hence
incompatible with header encryption. Devices that compress transport headers are dependent
on a stable header format, implying ossification of that format.
Introducing a new transport protocol, or changing the format of the transport header
information, will limit the effectiveness of header compression until the network devices are
updated. Encrypting the transport protocol headers will tend to cause the header compression to
fall back to compressing only the network-layer headers, with a significant reduction in
efficiency. This can limit connectivity if the resulting flow exceeds the link capacity or if the
packets are dropped because they exceed the link Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU).
The Secure RTP (SRTP) extensions  were explicitly designed to leave the transport
protocol headers unencrypted, but authenticated, since support for header compression was
considered important.
[RFC2507]
[RFC6846] [RFC2508] [RFC5795] [RFC8724]
[RFC3711]
RFC 9065 Transport Header Encryption July 2021
Fairhurst & Perkins Informational Page 16
2.6. To Verify SLA Compliance 
Observable transport headers coupled with published transport specifications allow operators
and regulators to explore and verify compliance with Service Level Agreements (SLAs). It can
also be used to understand whether a service is providing differential treatment to certain flows.
When transport header information cannot be observed, other methods have to be found to
confirm that the traffic produced conforms to the expectations of the operator or developer.
Independently verifiable performance metrics can be utilised to demonstrate regulatory
compliance in some jurisdictions and as a basis for informing design decisions. This can bring
assurance to those operating networks, often avoiding deployment of complex techniques that
routinely monitor and manage Internet traffic flows (e.g., avoiding the capital and operational
costs of deploying flow rate-limiting and network circuit breaker methods ).[RFC8084]
3. Research, Development, and Deployment 
Research and development of new protocols and mechanisms need to be informed by
measurement data (as described in the previous section). Data can also help promote acceptance
of proposed standards specifications by the wider community (e.g., as a method to judge the
safety for Internet deployment).
Observed data is important to ensure the health of the research and development communities
and provides data needed to evaluate new proposals for standardisation. Open standards
motivate a desire to include independent observation and evaluation of performance and
deployment data. Independent data helps compare different methods, judge the level of
deployment, and ensure the wider applicability of the results. This is important when
considering when a protocol or mechanism should be standardised for use in the general
Internet. This, in turn, demands control/understanding about where and when measurement
samples are collected. This requires consideration of the methods used to observe information
and the appropriate balance between encrypting all and no transport header information.
There can be performance and operational trade-offs in exposing selected information to
network tools. This section explores key implications of tools and procedures that observe
transport protocols but does not endorse or condemn any specific practises.
3.1. Independent Measurement 
Encrypting transport header information has implications on the way network data is collected
and analysed. Independent observations by multiple actors is currently used by the transport
community to maintain an accurate understanding of the network within transport area
working groups, IRTF research groups, and the broader research community. This is important to
be able to provide accountability and demonstrate that protocols behave as intended; although,
when providing or using such information, it is important to consider the privacy of the user and
their incentive for providing accurate and detailed information.
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Protocols that expose the state of the transport protocol in their header (e.g., timestamps used to
calculate the RTT, packet numbers used to assess congestion, and requests for retransmission)
provide an incentive for a sending endpoint to provide consistent information, because a
protocol will not work otherwise. An on-path observer can have confidence that well-known
(and ossified) transport header information represents the actual state of the endpoints when
this information is necessary for the protocol's correct operation.
Encryption of transport header information could reduce the range of actors that can observe
useful data. This would limit the information sources available to the Internet community to
understand the operation of new transport protocols, reducing information to inform design
decisions and standardisation of the new protocols and related operational practises. The
cooperating dependence of network, application, and host to provide communication
performance on the Internet is uncertain when only endpoints (i.e., at user devices and within
service platforms) can observe performance and when performance cannot be independently
verified by all parties.
3.2. Measurable Transport Protocols 
Transport protocol evolution and the ability to measure and understand the impact of protocol
changes have to proceed hand-in-hand. A transport protocol that provides observable headers
can be used to provide open and verifiable measurement data. Observation of pathologies has a
critical role in the design of transport protocol mechanisms and development of new
mechanisms and protocols and aides in understanding the interactions between cooperating
protocols and network mechanisms, the implications of sharing capacity with other traffic, and
the impact of different patterns of usage. The ability of other stakeholders to review transport
header traces helps develop insight into the performance and the traffic contribution of specific
variants of a protocol.
Development of new transport protocol mechanisms has to consider the scale of deployment and
the range of environments in which the transport is used. Experience has shown that it is often
difficult to correctly implement new mechanisms  and that mechanisms often evolve
as a protocol matures or in response to changes in network conditions, in network traffic, or to
application usage. Analysis is especially valuable when based on the behaviour experienced
across a range of topologies, vendor equipment, and traffic patterns.
Encryption enables a transport protocol to choose which internal state to reveal to devices on the
network path, what information to encrypt, and what fields to grease . A new design
can provide summary information regarding its performance, congestion control state, etc., or
make explicit measurement information available. For example,  specifies a way for a
QUIC endpoint to optionally set the spin bit to explicitly reveal the RTT of an encrypted transport
session to the on-path network devices. There is a choice of what information to expose. For
some operational uses, the information has to contain sufficient detail to understand, and
possibly reconstruct, the network traffic pattern for further testing. The interpretation of the
information needs to consider whether this information reflects the actual transport state of the
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New transport protocol formats are expected to facilitate an increased pace of transport
evolution and with it the possibility to experiment with and deploy a wide range of protocol
mechanisms. At the time of writing, there has been interest in a wide range of new transport
methods, e.g., larger initial window, Proportional Rate Reduction (PRR), congestion control
methods based on measuring bottleneck bandwidth and round-trip propagation time, the
introduction of AQM techniques, and new forms of ECN response (e.g., Data Centre TCP, DCTCP,
and methods proposed for Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput (L4S)). The growth and
diversity of applications and protocols using the Internet also continues to expand. For each new
method or application, it is desirable to build a body of data reflecting its behaviour under a
wide range of deployment scenarios, traffic load, and interactions with other deployed/candidate
methods.
3.3. Other Sources of Information 
Some measurements that traditionally rely on observable transport information could be
completed by utilising endpoint-based logging (e.g., based on  and 
). Such information has a diversity of uses, including developers wishing to debug/
understand the transport/application protocols with which they work, researchers seeking to
spot trends and anomalies, and to characterise variants of protocols. A standard format for
endpoint logging could allow these to be shared (after appropriate anonymisation) to understand
performance and pathologies.
When measurement datasets are made available by servers or client endpoints, additional
metadata, such as the state of the network and conditions in which the system was observed, is
often necessary to interpret this data to answer questions about network performance or
understand a pathology. Collecting and coordinating such metadata is more difficult when the
observation point is at a different location to the bottleneck or device under evaluation 
.
Despite being applicable in some scenarios, endpoint logs do not provide equivalent information
to on-path measurements made by devices in the network. In particular, endpoint logs contain
only a part of the information to understand the operation of network devices and identify
issues, such as link performance or capacity sharing between multiple flows. An analysis can
require coordination between actors at different layers to successfully characterise flows and
correlate the performance or behaviour of a specific mechanism with an equipment
configuration and traffic using operational equipment along a network path (e.g., combining
transport and network measurements to explore congestion control dynamics to understand the
implications of traffic on designs for active queue management or circuit breakers).
Another source of information could arise from Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
(OAM) (see Section 6). Information data records could be embedded into header information at
different layers to support functions, such as performance evaluation, path tracing, path
verification information, classification, and a diversity of other uses.
In-situ OAM (IOAM) data fields  can be encapsulated into a variety of protocols to
record operational and telemetry information in an existing packet while that packet traverses a
part of the path between two points in a network (e.g., within a particular IOAM management
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domain). IOAM-Data-Fields are independent from the protocols into which IOAM-Data-Fields are
encapsulated. For example, IOAM can provide proof that a traffic flow takes a predefined path,
SLA verification for the live data traffic, and statistics relating to traffic distribution.
4. Encryption and Authentication of Transport Headers 
There are several motivations for transport header encryption.
One motive to encrypt transport headers is to prevent network ossification from network devices
that inspect well-known transport headers. Once a network device observes a transport header
and becomes reliant upon using it, the overall use of that field can become ossified, preventing
new versions of the protocol and mechanisms from being deployed. Examples include:
During the development of TLS 1.3 , the design needed to function in the presence
of deployed middleboxes that relied on the presence of certain header fields exposed in TLS
1.2 . 
The design of Multipath TCP (MPTCP)  had to account for middleboxes (known as
"TCP Normalizers") that monitor the evolution of the window advertised in the TCP header
and then reset connections when the window did not grow as expected. 
TCP Fast Open  can experience problems due to middleboxes that modify the
transport header of packets by removing "unknown" TCP options. Segments with
unrecognised TCP options can be dropped, segments that contain data and set the SYN bit
can be dropped, and some middleboxes that disrupt connections can send data before
completion of the three-way handshake. 
Other examples of TCP ossification have included middleboxes that modify transport
headers by rewriting TCP sequence and acknowledgement numbers but are unaware of the
(newer) TCP selective acknowledgement (SACK) option and therefore fail to correctly rewrite
the SACK information to match the changes made to the fixed TCP header, preventing correct
SACK operation. 
In all these cases, middleboxes with a hard-coded, but incomplete, understanding of a specific
transport behaviour (i.e., TCP) interacted poorly with transport protocols after the transport
behaviour was changed. In some cases, the middleboxes modified or replaced information in the
transport protocol header.
Transport header encryption prevents an on-path device from observing the transport headers
and therefore stops ossified mechanisms being used that directly rely on or infer semantics of
the transport header information. This encryption is normally combined with authentication of
the protected information.  summarises this approach, stating that "[t]he wire image,
not the protocol's specification, determines how third parties on the network paths among
protocol participants will interact with that protocol" ( ), and it can be
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Encryption does not itself prevent ossification of the network service. People seeking to
understand or classify network traffic could still come to rely on pattern inferences and other
heuristics or machine learning to derive measurement data and as the basis for network
forwarding decisions . This can also create dependencies on the transport protocol or
the patterns of traffic it can generate, also resulting in ossification of the service.
Another motivation for using transport header encryption is to improve privacy and to decrease
opportunities for surveillance. Users value the ability to protect their identity and location and
defend against analysis of the traffic. Revelations about the use of pervasive surveillance 
 have, to some extent, eroded trust in the service offered by network operators and
have led to an increased use of encryption. Concerns have also been voiced about the addition of
metadata to packets by third parties to provide analytics, customisation, advertising, cross-site
tracking of users, customer billing, or selectively allowing or blocking content.
Whatever the reasons, the IETF is designing protocols that include transport header encryption
(e.g., QUIC ) to supplement the already widespread payload encryption and to further
limit exposure of transport metadata to the network.
If a transport protocol uses header encryption, the designers have to decide whether to encrypt
all or a part of the transport-layer information.  states, "Anything exposed
to the path should be done with the intent that it be used by the network elements on the path."
Certain transport header fields can be made observable to on-path network devices or can define
new fields designed to explicitly expose observable transport-layer information to the network.
Where exposed fields are intended to be immutable (i.e., can be observed but not modified by a
network device), the endpoints are encouraged to use authentication to provide a cryptographic
integrity check that can detect if these immutable fields have been modified by network devices.
Authentication can help to prevent attacks that rely on sending packets that fake exposed control
signals in transport headers (e.g., TCP RST spoofing). Making a part of a transport header
observable or exposing new header fields can lead to ossification of that part of a header as
network devices come to rely on observations of the exposed fields.
The use of transport header authentication and encryption therefore exposes a tussle between
middlebox vendors, operators, researchers, applications developers, and end users:
On the one hand, future Internet protocols that support transport header encryption assist in
the restoration of the end-to-end nature of the Internet by returning complex processing to
the endpoints. Since middleboxes cannot modify what they cannot see, the use of transport
header encryption can improve application and end-user privacy by reducing leakage of
transport metadata to operators that deploy middleboxes. 
On the other hand, encryption of transport-layer information has implications for network
operators and researchers seeking to understand the dynamics of protocols and traffic
patterns, since it reduces the information that is available to them. 
The following briefly reviews some security design options for transport protocols. "A Survey of
the Interaction between Security Protocols and Transport Services"  provides more
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Security work typically employs a design technique that seeks to expose only what is needed 
. This approach provides incentives to not reveal any information that is not necessary
for the end-to-end communication. The IETF has provided guidelines for writing security
considerations for IETF specifications .
Endpoint design choices impacting privacy also need to be considered as a part of the design
process . The IAB has provided guidance for analysing and documenting privacy
considerations within IETF specifications .
Authenticating the Transport Protocol Header:
Transport-layer header information can be authenticated. An example transport
authentication mechanism is TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) . This TCP option
authenticates the IP pseudo-header, TCP header, and TCP data. TCP-AO protects the transport
layer, preventing attacks from disabling the TCP connection itself and provides replay
protection. Such authentication might interact with middleboxes, depending on their
behaviour .
The IPsec Authentication Header (AH)  was designed to work at the network layer
and authenticate the IP payload. This approach authenticates all transport headers and
verifies their integrity at the receiver, preventing modification by network devices on the
path. The IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)  can also provide
authentication and integrity without confidentiality using the NULL encryption algorithm 
. SRTP  is another example of a transport protocol that allows header
authentication.
Integrity Check:
Transport protocols usually employ integrity checks on the transport header information.
Security methods usually employ stronger checks and can combine this with authentication.
An integrity check that protects the immutable transport header fields, but can still expose the
transport header information in the clear, allows on-path network devices to observe these
fields. An integrity check is not able to prevent modification by network devices on the path
but can prevent a receiving endpoint from accepting changes and avoid impact on the
transport protocol operation, including some types of attack. 
Selectively Encrypting Transport Headers and Payload:
A transport protocol design that encrypts selected header fields allows specific transport
header fields to be made observable by network devices on the path. This information is
explicitly exposed either in a transport header field or lower layer protocol header. A design
that only exposes immutable fields can also perform end-to-end authentication of these fields
across the path to prevent undetected modification of the immutable transport headers.
Mutable fields in the transport header provide opportunities where on-path network devices
can modify the transport behaviour (e.g., the extended headers described in 
). An example of a method that encrypts some, but not all, transport header
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Optional Encryption of Header Information:
There are implications to the use of optional header encryption in the design of a transport
protocol, where support of optional mechanisms can increase the complexity of the protocol
and its implementation and in the management decisions that have to be made to use
variable format fields. Instead, fields of a specific type ought to be sent with the same level of
confidentiality or integrity protection. 
Greasing:
Protocols often provide extensibility features, reserving fields or values for use by future
versions of a specification. The specification of receivers has traditionally ignored unspecified
values; however, on-path network devices have emerged that ossify to require a certain value
in a field or reuse a field for another purpose. When the specification is later updated, it is
impossible to deploy the new use of the field and forwarding of the protocol could even
become conditional on a specific header field value.
A protocol can intentionally vary the value, format, and/or presence of observable transport
header fields at random . This prevents a network device ossifying the use of a
specific observable field and can ease future deployment of new uses of the value or code
point. This is not a security mechanism, although the use can be combined with an
authentication mechanism.
Different transports use encryption to protect their header information to varying degrees. The
trend is towards increased protection.
[RFC8701]
5. Intentionally Exposing Transport Information to the
Network 
A transport protocol can choose to expose certain transport information to on-path devices
operating at the network layer by sending observable fields. One approach is to make an explicit
choice not to encrypt certain transport header fields, making this transport information
observable by an on-path network device. Another approach is to expose transport information
in a network-layer extension header (see Section 5.1). Both are examples of explicit information
intended to be used by network devices on the path .
Whatever the mechanism used to expose the information, a decision to expose only specific
information places the transport endpoint in control of what to expose outside of the encrypted
transport header. This decision can then be made independently of the transport protocol
functionality. This can be done by exposing part of the transport header or as a network-layer
option/extension.
[RFC8558]
5.1. Exposing Transport Information in Extension Headers 
At the network layer, packets can carry optional headers that explicitly expose transport header
information to the on-path devices operating at the network layer (Section 2.3.2). For example, an
endpoint that sends an IPv6 hop-by-hop option  can provide explicit transport-layer
information that can be observed and used by network devices on the path. New hop-by-hop
[RFC8200]
RFC 9065 Transport Header Encryption July 2021
Fairhurst & Perkins Informational Page 23
5.2. Common Exposed Transport Information 
There are opportunities for multiple transport protocols to consistently supply common
observable information . A common approach can result in an open definition of the
observable fields. This has the potential that the same information can be utilised across a range
of operational and analysis tools.
options are not recommended in  "because nodes may be configured to ignore the Hop-
by-Hop Options header, drop packets containing a Hop-by-Hop Options header, or assign packets
containing a Hop-by-Hop Options header to a slow processing path. Designers considering
defining new hop-by-hop options need to be aware of this likely behavior."
Network-layer optional headers explicitly indicate the information that is exposed, whereas use
of exposed transport header information first requires an observer to identify the transport
protocol and its format. See Section 2.2.
An arbitrary path can include one or more network devices that drop packets that include a
specific header or option used for this purpose (see ). This could impact the proper
functioning of the protocols using the path. Protocol methods can be designed to probe to





5.3. Considerations for Exposing Transport Information 
Considerations concerning what information, if any, it is appropriate to expose include:
On the one hand, explicitly exposing derived fields containing relevant transport
information (e.g., metrics for loss, latency, etc.) can avoid network devices needing to derive
this information from other header fields. This could result in development and evolution of
transport-independent tools around a common observable header and permit transport
protocols to also evolve independently of this ossified header . 
On the other hand, protocols and implementations might be designed to avoid consistently
exposing external information that corresponds to the actual internal information used by
the protocol itself. An endpoint/protocol could choose to expose transport header
information to optimise the benefit it gets from the network . The value of this
information for analysing operation of the transport layer would be enhanced if the exposed
information could be verified to match the transport protocol's observed behavior. 
The motivation to include actual transport header information and the implications of network
devices using this information has to be considered when proposing such a method. 
summarises this as:
When signals from endpoints to the path are independent from the signals used by
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without affecting the peer's understanding of the flow's state. For encrypted flows, this
divergence is not detectable by on-path devices. 
6. Addition of Transport OAM Information to Network-Layer
Headers 
Even when the transport headers are encrypted, on-path devices can make measurements by
utilising additional protocol headers carrying OAM information in an additional packet header.
OAM information can be included with packets to perform functions, such as identification of
transport protocols and flows, to aide understanding of network or transport performance or to
support network operations or mitigate the effects of specific network segments.
Using network-layer approaches to reveal information has the potential that the same method
(and hence same observation and analysis tools) can be consistently used by multiple transport
protocols. This approach also could be applied to methods beyond OAM (see Section 5). There can
also be less desirable implications from separating the operation of the transport protocol from
the measurement framework.
6.1. Use of OAM within a Maintenance Domain 
OAM information can be restricted to a maintenance domain, typically owned and operated by a
single entity. OAM information can be added at the ingress to the maintenance domain (e.g., an
Ethernet protocol header with timestamps and sequence number information using a method
such as 802.11ag or in-situ OAM  or as a part of the encapsulation protocol). This
additional header information is not delivered to the endpoints and is typically removed at the
egress of the maintenance domain.
Although some types of measurements are supported, this approach does not cover the entire
range of measurements described in this document. In some cases, it can be difficult to position
measurement tools at the appropriate segments/nodes, and there can be challenges in
correlating the downstream/upstream information when in-band OAM data is inserted by an on-
path device.
6.2. Use of OAM across Multiple Maintenance Domains 
OAM information can also be added at the network layer by the sender as an IPv6 extension
header or an IPv4 option or in an encapsulation/tunnel header that also includes an extension
header or option. This information can be used across multiple network segments or between
the transport endpoints.
One example is the IPv6 Performance and Diagnostic Metrics (PDM) destination option 
. This allows a sender to optionally include a destination option that carries header
fields that can be used to observe timestamps and packet sequence numbers. This information
[IOAM-DATA]
[RFC8250]
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7. Conclusions 
Header authentication and encryption and strong integrity checks are being incorporated into
new transport protocols and have important benefits. The pace of the development of transports
using the WebRTC data channel and the rapid deployment of the QUIC transport protocol can
both be attributed to using the combination of UDP as a substrate while providing confidentiality
and authentication of the encapsulated transport headers and payload.
This document has described some current practises, and the implications for some stakeholders,
when transport-layer header encryption is used. It does not judge whether these practises are
necessary or endorse the use of any specific practise. Rather, the intent is to highlight operational
tools and practises to consider when designing and modifying transport protocols, so protocol
designers can make informed choices about what transport header fields to encrypt and whether
it might be beneficial to make an explicit choice to expose certain fields to devices on the
network path. In making such a decision, it is important to balance:
User Privacy:
The less transport header information that is exposed to the network, the lower the risk of
leaking metadata that might have user privacy implications. Transports that chose to expose
some header fields need to make a privacy assessment to understand the privacy cost versus
benefit trade-off in making that information available. The design of the QUIC spin bit to the
network is an example of such considered analysis. 
Transport Ossification:
Unencrypted transport header fields are likely to ossify rapidly, as network devices come to
rely on their presence, making it difficult to change the transport in future. This argues that
the choice to expose information to the network is made deliberately and with care, since it is
essentially defining a stable interface between the transport and the network. Some protocols
will want to make that interface as limited as possible; other protocols might find value in
exposing certain information to signal to the network or in allowing the network to change
certain header fields as signals to the transport. The visible wire image of a protocol should be
explicitly designed. 
Network Ossification:
While encryption can reduce ossification of the transport protocol, it does not itself prevent
ossification of the network service. People seeking to understand network traffic could still
come to rely on pattern inferences and other heuristics or machine learning to derive
measurement data and as the basis for network forwarding decisions . This creates
dependencies on the transport protocol or the patterns of traffic it can generate, resulting in
ossification of the service. 
could be authenticated by a receiving transport endpoint when the information is added at the
sender and visible at the receiving endpoint, although methods to do this have not currently
been proposed. This needs to be explicitly enabled at the sender.
[RFC8546]
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Impact on Operational Practice:
The network operations community has long relied on being able to understand Internet
traffic patterns, both in aggregate and at the flow level, to support network management,
traffic engineering, and troubleshooting. Operational practice has developed based on the
information available from unencrypted transport headers. The IETF has supported this
practice by developing operations and management specifications, interface specifications,
and associated Best Current Practices. Widespread deployment of transport protocols that
encrypt their information will impact network operations unless operators can develop
alternative practises that work without access to the transport header. 
Pace of Evolution:
Removing obstacles to change can enable an increased pace of evolution. If a protocol
changes its transport header format (wire image) or its transport behaviour, this can result in
the currently deployed tools and methods becoming no longer relevant. Where this needs to
be accompanied by development of appropriate operational support functions and
procedures, it can incur a cost in new tooling to catch up with each change. Protocols that
consistently expose observable data do not require such development but can suffer from
ossification and need to consider if the exposed protocol metadata has privacy implications.
There is no single deployment context; therefore, designers need to consider the diversity of
operational networks (ISPs, enterprises, DDoS mitigation and firewall maintainers, etc.). 
Supporting Common Specifications:
Common, open, transport specifications can stimulate engagement by developers, users,
researchers, and the broader community. Increased protocol diversity can be beneficial in
meeting new requirements, but the ability to innovate without public scrutiny risks point
solutions that optimise for specific cases and that can accidentally disrupt operations of/in
different parts of the network. The social contract that maintains the stability of the Internet
relies on accepting common transport specifications and on it being possible to detect
violations. The existence of independent measurements, transparency, and public scrutiny of
transport protocol behaviour helps the community to enforce the social norm that protocol
implementations behave fairly and conform (at least mostly) to the specifications. It is
important to find new ways of maintaining that community trust as increased use of
transport header encryption limits visibility into transport behaviour (see also Section 5.3). 
Impact on Benchmarking and Understanding Feature Interactions:
An appropriate vantage point for observation, coupled with timing information about traffic
flows, provides a valuable tool for benchmarking network devices, endpoint stacks, and/or
configurations. This can help understand complex feature interactions. An inability to
observe transport header information can make it harder to diagnose and explore
interactions between features at different protocol layers, a side effect of not allowing a
choice of vantage point from which this information is observed. New approaches might have
to be developed. 
Impact on Research and Development:
Hiding transport header information can impede independent research into new
mechanisms, measurements of behaviour, and development initiatives. Experience shows
that transport protocols are complicated to design and complex to deploy and that individual
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mechanisms have to be evaluated while considering other mechanisms across a broad range
of network topologies and with attention to the impact on traffic sharing the capacity. If
increased use of transport header encryption results in reduced availability of open data, it
could eliminate the independent checks to the standardisation process that have previously
been in place from research and academic contributors (e.g., the role of the IRTF Internet
Congestion Control Research Group (ICCRG) and research publications in reviewing new
transport mechanisms and assessing the impact of their deployment). 
Observable transport header information might be useful to various stakeholders. Other sets of
stakeholders have incentives to limit what can be observed. This document does not make
recommendations about what information ought to be exposed, to whom it ought to be
observable, or how this will be achieved. There are also design choices about where observable
fields are placed. For example, one location could be a part of the transport header outside of the
encryption envelope; another alternative is to carry the information in a network-layer option or
extension header. New transport protocol designs ought to explicitly identify any fields that are
intended to be observed, consider if there are alternative ways of providing the information, and
reflect on the implications of observable fields being used by on-path network devices and how
this might impact user privacy and protocol evolution when these fields become ossified.
As  notes, "Making networks unmanageable to mitigate PM is not an acceptable
outcome, but ignoring PM would go against the consensus documented here." Providing explicit
information can help avoid traffic being inappropriately classified, impacting application
performance. An appropriate balance will emerge over time as real instances of this tension are
analysed . This balance between information exposed and information hidden ought to
be carefully considered when specifying new transport protocols.
[RFC7258]
[RFC7258]
8. Security Considerations 
This document is about design and deployment considerations for transport protocols. Issues
relating to security are discussed throughout this document.
Authentication, confidentiality protection, and integrity protection are identified as transport
features by . As currently deployed in the Internet, these features are generally
provided by a protocol or layer on top of the transport protocol .
Confidentiality and strong integrity checks have properties that can also be incorporated into the
design of a transport protocol or to modify an existing transport. Integrity checks can protect an
endpoint from undetected modification of protocol fields by on-path network devices, whereas
encryption and obfuscation or greasing can further prevent these headers being utilised by
network devices . Preventing observation of headers provides an opportunity for
greater freedom to update the protocols and can ease experimentation with new techniques and
their final deployment in endpoints. A protocol specification needs to weigh the costs of ossifying
common headers versus the potential benefits of exposing specific information that could be
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Header encryption can provide confidentiality of some or all of the transport header
information. This prevents an on-path device from gaining knowledge of the header field. It
therefore prevents mechanisms being built that directly rely on the information or seeks to infer
semantics of an exposed header field. Reduced visibility into transport metadata can limit the
ability to measure and characterise traffic and conversely can provide privacy benefits.
Extending the transport payload security context to also include the transport protocol header
protects both types of information with the same key. A privacy concern would arise if this key
was shared with a third party, e.g., providing access to transport header information to debug a
performance issue would also result in exposing the transport payload data to the same third
party. Such risks would be mitigated using a layered security design that provides one domain of
protection and associated keys for the transport payload and encrypted transport headers and a
separate domain of protection and associated keys for any observable transport header fields.
Exposed transport headers are sometimes utilised as a part of the information to detect
anomalies in network traffic. As stated in , "While PM is an attack, other forms of
monitoring that might fit the definition of PM can be beneficial and not part of any attack, e.g.,
network management functions monitor packets or flows and anti-spam mechanisms need to see
mail message content." This can be used as the first line of defence to identify potential threats
from DoS or malware and redirect suspect traffic to dedicated nodes responsible for DoS
analysis, for malware detection, or to perform packet "scrubbing" (the normalisation of packets
so that there are no ambiguities in interpretation by the ultimate destination of the packet).
These techniques are currently used by some operators to also defend from distributed DoS
attacks.
Exposed transport header fields can also form a part of the information used by the receiver of a
transport protocol to protect the transport layer from data injection by an attacker. In evaluating
this use of exposed header information, it is important to consider whether it introduces a
significant DoS threat. For example, an attacker could construct a DoS attack by sending packets
with a sequence number that falls within the currently accepted range of sequence numbers at
the receiving endpoint. This would then introduce additional work at the receiving endpoint,
even though the data in the attacking packet might not finally be delivered by the transport
layer. This is sometimes known as a "shadowing attack". An attack can, for example, disrupt
receiver processing, trigger loss and retransmission, or make a receiving endpoint perform
unproductive decryption of packets that cannot be successfully decrypted (forcing a receiver to
commit decryption resources, or to update and then restore protocol state).
One mitigation to off-path attacks is to deny knowledge of what header information is accepted
by a receiver or obfuscate the accepted header information, e.g., setting a nonpredictable initial
value for a sequence number during a protocol handshake, as in  and , or a
port value that cannot be predicted (see ). A receiver could also require
additional information to be used as a part of a validation check before accepting packets at the
transport layer, e.g., utilising a part of the sequence number space that is encrypted or by
verifying an encrypted token not visible to an attacker. This would also mitigate against on-path
attacks. An additional processing cost can be incurred when decryption is attempted before a
receiver discards an injected packet.
[RFC7258]
[RFC3550] [RFC6056]
Section 5.1 of [RFC8085]
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